Press Releases

Kuster Calls for Independent Investigation of Attack on United States Capitol

**Letter to Speaker Nancy Pelosi and House Administration Committee Leadership requests establishment of Independent Commission and seeks answers regarding failed effort to protect the U.S. Capitol**

 Washington, D.C. — Today, Rep. Annie Kuster (NH-02) joined 40 of her colleagues in calling upon Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, House Administration Committee Chair Zoe Lofgren (CA-19) and House Administration Committee Ranking Member Rodney Davis (IL-13) to establish an independent commission to undertake a thorough investigation of the domestic terrorist attack on the U.S. Capitol that occurred on Wednesday, January 6th. In the letter, Members outline specific questions and issues regarding the lack of preparation and inadequate security protocols that resulted in the deaths of five individuals, including one Capitol Police Officer who died from injuries sustained while defending the U.S. Capitol. 

 

“The domestic terrorist attack that took place earlier this week on the U.S. Capitol is a stain on our nation’s history,” said Rep. Kuster. “This attempt to disrupt the peaceful transfer of power – our nation’s most sacred tradition – is an affront not only to our values as Americans but to our very democracy. While I commend the efforts of the United States Capitol Police for their work to protect Members of Congress and staff, it is clear that an independent investigation is urgently needed to examine how this horrific attack was allowed to happen. It is imperative that new security protocols be established to protect our seat of government, and it is my hope that an independent commission will provide recommendations to Congress on how best to enact these changes.”

 

The Members have requested the independent commission investigate numerous issues, including:

 

  • What was the U.S. Capitol Police’s plan to protect the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, and how did it compare to best practices for protecting high-value targets near gatherings of violent extremists?
  • How did the U.S. Capitol Police coordinate in advance of January 6, 2021, with the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, federal law enforcement agencies, and the D.C. National Guard, and what plans were made in advance to utilize these resources both initially and in case the situation escalated?
  • Who was giving orders to U.S. Capitol Police on January 6, 2021, and did those orders include responding with limited force?
  • Did the U.S. Capitol Police monitor social media or coordinate with other federal law enforcement agencies to monitor social media in advance of January 6, 2021?
  • Why were only 14 arrests made by U.S. Capitol Police? Can the U.S. Capitol Police explain the difference in their response to the events of January 6, 2021 as compared to the response to other protests, including, but not limited to, the peaceful protests against police violence during the summer of 2020, the nomination of Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh, and the repeal of the Affordable Care Act?
  • Given video footage of at least one U.S. Capitol Police officer taking a selfie with domestic terrorists, and footage of U.S. Capitol Police officers potentially opening gates to other rioters, are there mechanisms in place to monitor and determine whether Capitol Police officers have alliances with violent extremist groups?
  • Should Congress implement background check requirements for all employees working in the Capitol complex?
  • Should the U.S. Capitol Police implement new security procedures for visitors to the Capitol Complex? What would be the costs of implementing new security procedures?
  • How can the U.S. Capitol Police improve overall security of the Capitol complex?

 

The full text of the letter is available below, and the letter is accessible here.

 

“Dear Speaker Pelosi, Chairperson Lofgren, and Ranking Member Davis:

 

Yesterday, as we gathered in the hallowed halls of the Capitol to uphold our duty under the Constitution to certify our free and fair election, the seat of government dissolved into anarchy with massive security failures by the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP), and no initial presence of the D.C. National Guard, the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia, or other law enforcement agencies. While many Capitol police officers displayed courage in the face of an onslaught of rioters, yesterday’s breach laid bare how insufficiently prepared the USCP is to protect the seat of government and the thousands of people who work in the Capitol complex each day.

 

Despite promises made to Members of Congress that every precaution was being taken and that there was adequate manpower and coordination, hundreds of people were able to easily enter restricted parts of the Capitol grounds, including the steps, and break into the building itself.

 

Perhaps most alarming, the Secretary of the Army and the chief of the District of Columbia’s police force stated that they did not expect President Trump’s supporters to try to enter the Capitol building, despite the fact that rioters discussed their plans to do just that in extensive, public online conversations.2 Further, President Trump had been inciting his supporters for days leading up to January 6, summoning them to a “wild” protest, and urging them on the day of the protest to head to the Capitol and fight.3 The lawlessness that occurred at the Capitol yesterday was unarguably foreseeable.

 

Even before yesterday’s events, it was clear that security at the Capitol was inadequate to address current security threats. Thousands of people are able to flow in and out of the Capitol complex each day, unlike other federal buildings, where employees must provide security officers with the names of all visitors, who then present identification and receive badges that must be returned before leaving. With little more than a quick X-Ray scan of bags and a quick walk through a metal detector, individuals have nearly unfettered access to Congressional offices and Committee rooms. Members are able to hire staff and interns at their own discretion, and background checks are not required in order to receive a Congressional badge, which opens up even more access.

 

Yesterday’s breach was a wake-up call: The Capitol security system, as it currently exists, is woefully insufficient. That is why we are calling for the creation of an independent commission to investigate the security shortcomings at the U.S. Capitol, both during yesterday’s alarming breach and more broadly in order to make the Capitol complex more secure.

 

Among other issues, the commission should investigate the following:

 

1. What was the U.S. Capitol Police’s plan to protect the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, and how did it compare to best practices for protecting high-value targets near gatherings of violent extremists?

2. How did the U.S. Capitol Police coordinate in advance of January 6, 2021, with the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, federal law enforcement agencies, and the D.C. National Guard, and what plans were made in advance to utilize these resources both initially and in case the situation escalated?

3. Who was giving orders to U.S. Capitol Police on January 6, 2021, and did those orders include responding with limited force?

4. Why did it take so long for additional law enforcement to respond on January 6, 2021, and who was in charge of calling in reinforcements?

5. Did the U.S. Capitol Police have a protocol in place to ensure Congressional staff and other persons in the complex were safe and accounted for, and was it sufficient?

6. Was there a sweep conducted of each House and Senate office building before the Capitol complex was announced secure and before Congressional staff, Members, and Capitol staff were given the all clear?

7. Did the U.S. Capitol Police monitor social media or coordinate with other federal law enforcement agencies to monitor social media in advance of January 6, 2021? Does the U.S. Capitol Police regularly monitor social media as part of its law enforcement efforts?

8. Did the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have intelligence that there may be a domestic terrorist attack on January 6, 2021? If so, did they provide reports to the U.S. Capitol Police, the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, and the Secretary of the Army?

9. How do the U.S. Capitol Police handle jurisdictional issues with other law enforcement agencies in the District of Columbia?

10. Given video footage of at least one U.S. Capitol Police officer taking a selfie with domestic terrorists, and footage of U.S. Capitol Police officers potentially opening gates to other rioters, are there mechanisms in place to monitor and determine whether Capitol Police officers have alliances with violent extremist groups?

11. Why were only 14 arrests made by U.S. Capitol Police? Can the U.S. Capitol Police explain the difference in their response to the events of January 6, 2021 as compared to the response to other protests, including, but not limited to, the peaceful protests against police violence during the summer of 2020, the nomination of Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh, and the repeal of the Affordable Care Act?

12. Did U.S. Capitol Police have sufficient manpower and weaponry to respond to the anticipated threat?

13. Reports indicate that between 50 and 60 U.S. Capitol Police officers were injured on January 6, 2021. One officer, Brian D. Sicknick, was injured while physically engaging with protestors, and succumbed to his injuries. Did insufficient manpower and planning on the part of the U.S. Capitol Police contribute to those injuries and deaths?

14. Does the U.S. Capitol Police have protocols in place to regularly coordinate with the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia and other federal law enforcement agencies?

15. From what sources does the U.S. Capitol Police receive intelligence analysis about potential threats to the Capitol and employees, and are these sources sufficient?

16. Should Congress implement background check requirements for all employees working in the Capitol complex?

17. Should the U.S. Capitol Police implement new security procedures for visitors to the Capitol complex? What would be the costs of implementing new security procedures?

18. How can the U.S. Capitol Police improve overall security of the Capitol complex?

 

At the conclusion of its investigation, the commission should provide a report and briefing for all Members with its analysis, conclusions, and recommendations to improve security of the Capitol

complex and prevent future breaches of security.

 

In the immediate term, we should require the U.S. Capitol Police to brief Congress on how it will strengthen its security plan, based on the events of this week, for the inauguration of President-elect Joseph R. Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris in order to ensure Members of Congress, our staff, Capitol employees, and the residents of the District of Columbia have confidence in their safety.

 

We look forward to working with you to stand up this critical commission to ensure Congress can safely do its job, while maintaining transparency and access for the American people to their

government.”

 

 

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